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Economic Spillovers and Political Values in





This paper examines how economic spillovers and political values affect strategies
and welfare of governments bidding for firms. Government competition and firm loca-
tion choice are modeled as a variant of a first-price scoring auction in which governments
compete for firms that have unobserved geographic preferences. Within-metro economic
spillovers generate freeriding motives, implying that metro-level coordination can im-
prove joint expected welfare of individual governments. However, presence of political
values can steer governments away from coordination such as ceasefire on incentive pro-
vision. Reduced-form evidence suggests that political values increase with the intensity
of within-metro competition and that governments freeride when economic values spill
over. Measures of economic spillovers are informative of the size of political values;
back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that total political values for 112 firms that
relocated within Kansas City amount to over $89 million.
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Subsidy Tracker and Hall Family Foundation for providing access to Kansas City incentives data. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Good Jobs First or
Hall Family Foundation. All errors are my own.
1 Introduction
Individual state and local governments use business incentives to compete for firms, but
the economic benefits of attracting firms are often not limited to the winning jurisdictions.
Employment opportunities generated by firm entry to one jurisdiction, for example, are
non-excludable to the residents of nearby jurisdictions. On the other hand, political values
that elected officials privately derive when attracting firms to their own jurisdictions do not
spill over to other jurisdictions.
Presence of economic spillovers would, in theory, lead governments to bid lower to
freeride on wins of nearby jurisdictions, suggesting that governments in a region may be
able to improve their collective welfare through coordination that internalizes the positive
externalities. On the other hand, presence of political values would escalate competition
and lead governments to bid higher to derive private values of winning.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that governments tend to bid more aggressively in settings
where economic spillovers are likely present and that inter-jurisdictional coordination is
difficult to achieve. For example, the heated bidding war between Kansas and Missouri at
the state border in Kansas City and numerous failed attempts of the two states to agree on
an end to the bidding war until August 2019 have received much public attention.
How high are governments’ political values for firms? How important are economic
spillovers, political values, and firms’ geographic preferences in determining governments’
gains from coordination?
To answer these questions, I model government competition and firm location choice as
a variant of a first-price scoring auction in which governments compete for firms that have
unobserved geographic preferences, similar to approaches taken by Mast (2020) and Kim
(2020). This paper further distinguishes economic and political values for firms, assuming
that the two types of values are comonotonic. Governments in the model derive economic
spillovers when other governments in the same metro area attract firms, but political values
are derived only by the winning governments. This paper also allows unobserved firm profits
to be correlated within metro in the style of nested logit models.
In my model, governments in the same metro can improve their joint expected welfare
through coordinating on incentive provision. There are two sources of gains from coordi-
nation. First, governments can internalize competitive externalities and pay less for their
wins. This type of welfare gain is increasing in correlation of within-metro firm profits
which intensifies within-metro competition and cannibalization, but decreasing in economic
spillovers, which lead to freeriding and lower incentive offers. Second, governments can
internalize economic spillovers and increase their joint probability of winning firms through
raising incentive offers. This type of welfare gain is increasing in economic spillovers but
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decreasing in the correlation of within-metro firm profits, which lowers the probability of
firms being diverted away from other metros.
When firms’ location choices are restricted to a particular metro, governments in the
metro may improve their collective welfare through banning incentive provision to those
firms; similar argument has often been publicly discussed as a possible regional economic
development policy. However, in my model, less profitable locations in the metro are strictly
better off by individually competing for firms, implying that transfers from the most prof-
itable location in the metro is necessary for locations to be willing to participate in a ceasefire
on incentive provision. This result sheds some light on why ceasefire on incentive provision
rarely comes to fruition despite public support.
Using equilibrium relationships between governments’ values for firms and optimal in-
centive offers, I conduct two empirical exercises to learn about political values and freeriding
behavior without estimating the model primitives. In these exercises, I use observed com-
muting flows among states within a Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) as shifters of
economic spillovers.
First, I provide reduced-form evidence that political values of winning firms are higher
when there are more local competitors. I find that political values are higher for smaller firms
that are more likely to limit their location choices to a particular metro area, suggesting that
ceasefire on incentive provision at metro-level is unlikely to benefit individual governments
without transfers. I also find evidence of freeriding behavior; when more of in-state residents
commute out of state for work, governments tend to have lower accepted incentives.
Second, I conduct back-of-the-envelope calculations of the lower bounds on political
values for firms. I show that the magnitudes of economic spillovers are informative of the
magnitudes of political values; higher economic spillovers lead governments to freeride more,
leaving more of their incentive offers to be driven by political values. Back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that total political values for 112 firms that relocated within Kansas
City amount to at least $89 million.
Related literature
This paper contributes to the literature on effects of government policies and firm entry on
local welfare (e.g., Neumark and Kolko (2010), Kline and Moretti (2014), Billings (2009),
Moretti and Wilson (2017), and Patrick (2016)) by analyzing welfare impacts of incentive
provision in presence of local economic spillovers across jurisdictions. This paper’s auction
framework is similar to the approaches taken by Mast (2020), Slattery (2020), and Kim
(2020). In contrast to these earlier studies, this paper explicitly distinguishes economic and
political values for firms and provides a way of partially learning about the two types of
values separately without estimating the model primitives.
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This paper is related to the literature studying the importance of political factors in
determining government incentives. Jensen et al. (2014) provide evidence using internet
surveys that politicians benefit from offering tax incentives by taking credit for investment
inflows, and Jensen et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence that elected mayors provide
larger incentives and enjoy more lax oversight of incentive projects than non-elected city
managers. Stokan and Deslatte (2019) provide empirical evidence that incentive usage
is increasing in proliferation of local governments. My paper complements this literature
by providing empirical evidence that political values are increasing in the intensity of local
competition. I also provide an alternative method of learning about political values through
equilibrium relationships between governments’ values and optimal bids and using observed
shifters of economic spillovers.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
Metros are denoted by m ∈ M := {1 · · ·M}, and states are denoted by s ∈ S := {1 · · ·S}.
A metro is a part of at least one and possibly multiple states (e.g., Chicago-IL, Chicago-IN,
Chicago-WI); Sm denotes the set of states that metro m is a part of. A state has at least
one metro and possibly multiple metros (e.g., Chicago-IL, Champaign-IL, etc.);Ms denotes
the set of metros that belong to state s.
In this geography, governments, interchangeably used with locations hereafter, are de-
fined at the metro-state level and denoted by ms ∈ L := {{m} × Sm}m∈M. Firms are
denoted by j ∈ J := {1 · · · J}.
Each firm j ∈ J chooses a location for its establishment. Each location ms ∈ L offers
to pay incentives to j if choosing ms. The timing of ms’s incentive offer decision and j’s
location decision is:
1. Each ms ∈ L offers incentives bjms to firm j ∈ J .
2. j chooses a location ms that maximizes firm profit πjms.
2.2 Firm profits
Firm j chooses location ms that maximizes firm profit which is specified as:
πjms = β
bbjms + β
xxms + ξms + ζjm + (1− σ)εjms,
where bjms is the amount of incentives offered by ms to j, xms is a vector of observed
characteristics of ms, ξms is an unobserved scalar characteristic of ms, ζjm is j’s unobserved
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metro-level profit shock, and εjms is j’s unobserved location-level profit shock. Although
locations know the distribution of ζjm and εjms, their realization are j’s private information.
Following nested logit structure, ζjm+(1−σ)εjms is distributed Type I Extreme Value with
the nesting parameter 0 ≤ σ < 1 governing correlation of πjms within metro m. Correlation
of firm profitabilities within metro goes to one (zero) as σ goes to one (zero).
I use πjms to denote j’s profit in ms excluding excluding incentives: πjms = πjms −
βbbjms. I refer to πjms as j’s base profit in ms.
2.3 Economic and political values of winning firms
Location ms derives value Vjms from attracting firm j to ms. Vjms is additively separable






Economic values V ejms are social benefits to ms’s residents (e.g., new employment opportu-




jms) is independently drawn from joint distributions of ms’s economic and po-
litical values, F(V ems,V
p
ms)
(·, ·), on bounded support [0, ve]× [0, vp]. F(V ems,V pms)(·, ·) is common
knowledge but realization of (V ejms, V
p
jms) is ms’s private information.








(U)) U ∼ U(0, 1).
One interpretation of the assumed comonotonicity of (V ejms, V
p
jms) is that political gains
are increasing in economic benefits to residents. For example, a governor’s approval rating
likely increases by more when she attracts more jobs for her constituents.
2.4 Economic spillover values
Location ms derives spillover value, Ṽ ms
′
jms , when firm j chooses state s
′ 6= s in metro m. For
example, when a firm chooses Chicago-IL, Chicago-IN would derive Ṽ Chi-ILChi-IN . Ṽ
ms′
jms captures
economic values generated by j’s entry to ms′ that are non-excludable to residents of ms.
Ṽ ms
′










ms is a coefficient that determines the share of V
e
jms that ms derives when ms
′
wins. I assume 0 ≤ γms′ms ≤ 1 so that ms’s spillover values are non-negative and not greater
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than the economic values of winning.1 I refer to γms
′
ms as the “spillover coefficient.”
2.5 Equilibrium incentive offers
Given a draw of political and economic values, (vpjms, v
e
jms), location ms optimally chooses





jms − b) Pr(ms wins j | ms offers b to j)︸ ︷︷ ︸









′ wins j | ms offers b to j)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spillover value if ms′ wins j
.
First-order condition of this problem is:














Pr(ms wins j | ms offers b to j)
∂




′ wins j | ms offers b to j)
∂
∂b Pr(ms wins j | ms offers b to j)
.
Djms(b) is analogous to strategic markdown in standard first-price sealed-bid auctions.







jms(b) is an additional bid shading that results from
ms’s freeriding motive; by lowering bid, ms can raise the probability of ms′ winning, in
which case ms derives spillover values. D̃jms(b) is analogous to the diversion ratio in the
optimal pricing condition of a multi-product oligopolist. It measures the rate at which ms
is diverting firms away from ms′ when ms marginally increases its bid. Intuitively, higher
magnitude of diversion ratio leads ms to freeride more by shading its bid, since ms faces
higher probability of deriving spillover values by letting ms′ win instead of escalating a
within-metro bidding war. Magnitude of the diversion ratio is increasing in the correlation
of firm profitabilities in ms and ms′, which is governed by the nesting parameter, σ, in the
firm profit function.
Let τms : [0, v
p]× [0, ve]→ [0, b] denote ms’s equilibrium bid function that maps vectors
1This model does not allow negative spillovers such as congestion, pollution, and increase in housing
costs to dominate positive spillovers such as employment.
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of political and economic values into optimal bids. I assume ∂τms
∂vpms
> 0, ∂τms∂vems
> 0 so that
equilibrium bids are strictly increasing in political and economic values. Let GBms(·) denote
the distribution of ms’s equilibrium bids.
Pr(ms wins j | ms offers b to j) in Equation 1 can be expressed in terms of GBms :
Pr(ms wins j | ms offers b to j) =
∫ ∏
l∈L\ms
GBms (b+ πms − πl) dHπ,
where Hπ is the joint distribution of j’s base profits in locations.
2.6 Welfare of firms and locations

















where d(j) denotes the location chosen by firm j. W π is equal to the sum of realized firm
profits, and W v is equal to the sum of: (1) realized values of winning locations; and (2)
realized spillover values of locations in same metros as the winning locations.
Total welfare W is then defined as the sum of welfare of firms and locations. Incentive














3 Government coordination within metro
3.1 Maximizing metro-level expected welfare: an example
Locations in a given metro can collectively benefit in two ways from offering incentives that
maximize the sum of their expected welfare.
First, internalization of competitive externalities exerts a downward pressure on incen-
tive offers and allows locations to pay less for their wins. This type of welfare gain is higher
when firm profits among coordinating locations are more correlated, which corresponds to
higher nesting parameter, σ, and higher magnitude of diversion ratio among coordinating
locations,
∣∣∣D̃ms′jms∣∣∣, in the model. Intuitively, more substitutable locations bid more aggres-
sively against each other under competition and thus have more to gain when competition
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among such locations is removed.2 However, this type of welfare gain is decreasing in the
size of economic spillovers, since locations shade their incentive offers by more to freeride
when spillovers are larger, leaving coordination less room to further decrease offers. For
example, locations in a metro that are substitutable only among themselves can coordinate
to lower optimal incentive offers close to zero, as such locations would only cannibalize each
other under competition:
∣∣∣∑s′∈Sm D̃ms′ms ∣∣∣ = 1 for s ∈ Sm where m is metro under coordi-
nation.3 However, if spillovers are so large that locations derive the same values as long
as some location in the metro wins (i.e., ṽms
′
jms = vjms), locations would have offered zero
incentives to freeride even without coordination.
Second, internalization of economic spillovers exerts an upward pressure on incentive
offers and allows locations to increase their joint probability of winning firms. This type
of welfare gain mitigates the inefficiency of the externality problem and is increasing in
the size of economic spillovers among coordinating locations. However, this type of welfare
gain is decreasing in the correlation of firm profits among coordinating locations. For
example, when coordinating locations are substitutable only among themselves, any attempt
to increase the joint probability of winning firms through offering higher incentives would
fail as locations are unable to divert firms away from outside the metro.
For illustration, consider a simple example with three locations, A1, A2 and B3, com-
peting for a firm. Metro A – a multi-state metro – belongs to states 1 and 2. On the
other hand, metro B only belongs to state 3. A1 and A2’s optimal incentive offers under












First-order condition for optimal b̂As, s ∈ {1, 2}, under coordination are:
b̂As = vAs + ṽ
As







where DAs(b̂A1, b̂A2) =
−Pr(As wins | A1, A2 offer b̂A1, b̂A2)
∂
∂b̂As
Pr(As wins | A1, A2 offer b̂A1, b̂A2)
denotes the strategic markdown
and D̃As(b̂A1, b̂A2) =
∂
∂b̂As
Pr(A(−s) wins | A1, A2 offer b̂A1, b̂A2)
∂
∂b̂As
Pr(As wins | A1, A2 offer b̂A1, b̂A2)
denotes the diversion ratio of As.
Local changes from bAs that satisfies Equation 1 (optimal non-coordinated incentive
offers) to b̂As that satisfies Equation 2 (optimal coordinated incentive offers) are captured
by ṽAsA(−s)+D̃As(b̂A1, b̂A2)(vA(−s)−b̂A(−s)) in Equation 2. Downward pressure on bids exerted
2This type of welfare gain for coordinating locations is analogous to profit gain for competing firms that
raise prices after a merger (unilateral effect).
3These locations would still offer positive incentives under coordination if they draw different values for
firms; it may be optimal for the metro to attract firms to locations that drew high values.
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by internalization of competitive externalities is captured by D̃As(b̂A1, b̂A2)(vA(−s)− b̂A(−s)).
On the other hand, upward pressure on bids exerted by internalization of economic spillovers
is captured by ṽAsA(−s).
Simulated gains from coordination
Using simulations of parameterized model, I show that A1 and A2’s collective welfare gains
from coordination on incentive provision are: (1) increasing in correlation of firm profits
holding fixed economic spillovers; and (2) increasing in economic spillovers holding fixed
correlation of firm profits. Discussion above suggests that gains from internalization of
competitive externalities are small when locations offer low incentives to freeride even with-
out coordination. On the other hand, gains from internalization of economic spillovers are
small when firms rarely find locations substitutable across metros.
I assume that A1, A2, and B3 have identical deterministic firm profitabilities, βxxπms,
and that economic and political values for firms, (vems, v
p
ms), are iid. On the other hand, I
assume a range of values for the nesting parameter in firm profit function, σ, and spillover
coefficient, γ = γA2A1 = γ
A1
A2 . Under this parameterization, I simulate government competition
with and without A1 and A2’s coordination by numerically solving for locations’ equilibrium
bidding strategies. I then simulate firms’ choices and resulting welfare for locations and
firms. Details of this simulation exercise are included in the appendix.
Figure 1 shows the distributions of simulated changes in A1 and A2’s joint welfare, in-
centive offers, and joint win share under coordination. Figure 1a shows that when spillovers
between A1 and A2 are low (i.e., low γ), A1 and A2’s joint welfare gains from coordination
are increasing as their firm profits are more correlated (i.e., higher σ). Figure 1b shows
that changes in A1’s incentive offers are increasingly negative as correlation of firm profits
in A1 and A2 increases, illustrating that these gains from coordination are derived from
internalization of competitive externalities.
On the other hand, when spillovers between A1 and A2 are high, welfare gains are
more pronounced as A1 and A2 offer higher incentive offers that divert firms away from
B3; however, higher incentive offers are occasionally “wasted” on firms that would have
chosen either A1 and A2 even without coordination, resulting in more pronounced welfare
losses as well. Figure 1c shows that changes in A2 and A2’s joint win share are positive
when spillovers are high, illustrating that these gains are derived from internalization of
economic spillovers. Further, these gains are decreasing as firm profits in A1 and A2 are
more correlated, making it more difficult to divert firms away from B3.
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Figure 1: Simulations changes in A1, A2’s welfare, bids, and win shares under coordination
(a) Distribution of simulated changes in A1, A2’s joint welfare under coordination




































































(b) Distribution of simulated changes in A1’s incentive offers under coordination
































































(c) Simulated changes in A1, A2’s joint win share under coordination






































































Notes: Figure 1a shows box plots of simulated changes in A1, A2’s joint welfare realized in each competition
when A1, A2 coordinate. Figure 1b shows box plots of simulated changes in A1’s optimal incentive offers
when A1, A2 coordinate; results for A2 are similar due to symmetry between A1 and A2. Figure 1c shows
simulated changes in A1, A2’s joint win share when A1, A2 coordinate. Each subfigure displays simulated
changes under different values of: (1) spillover coefficient (γ = γA2A1 = γ
A1
A2) that governs the size of economic
spillovers between A1 and A2; and (2) nesting parameter (σ) that governs the correlation of firm profits in
A1 and A2. Appendix provides details of the simulation exercise.
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Ceasefire on incentive provision
Locations in a metro collectively abstaining from incentive provision (“ceasefire”) is often
discussed as a way to curb within-metro competition for firms that are likely to choose the
metro even without incentives. Main rationale for this policy is that if a firm is willing to
locate in the metro with zero incentives, tax dollars should not be used simply to incentivize
the firm to locate in one part of the metro. Despite public support, ceasefire proposals rarely
reach or take a long time until final agreement.4
In the previous example, ceasefire is equivalent to setting b̂A1 = b̂A2 = 0, which can be
A1 and A2’s optimal incentive offers under coordination when firms are locked in to metro
A so that D̃A2A1 = D̃
A1
A2 = −1. While ceasefire can improve collective welfare of A1 and A2
through eliminating within-metro cannibalization, A1 and A2 may not individually benefit
from a ceasefire without transfers from the winning to losing location.
For intuition, suppose under a ceasefire between A1 and A2, a firm would choose A2
(i.e., πA2 > πA1) so that A2 derives its value for the firm, vA2, while A1 only derives
spillover value, ṽA2A1. In this case, A1 would be strictly better off under competition, since
A1’s freeriding markdown is equal to ṽA2A1, implying that A1 can derive more than ṽ
A2
A1
when it wins.5 On the other hand, A2 would be strictly better off under ceasefire, since
its expected welfare under competition is strictly below vA2 when it has to offer incentives.
Hence, without transfers, A1 would not be willing to participate in a ceasefire.
This example sheds some light on why ceasefire agreements without arrangements of
transfers among locations are seldom reached in reality. When a firm is certain to choose
a particular metro, less profitable locations in that metro (e.g., A1) can only expect to
do better by competing for the firm as long as the probability of winning is positive and
spillover values are less than total economic and political values (e.g., ṽA2A1 < vA1). This
means that if spillover values are less than economic values, elected officials may not agree
to a ceasefire even if they had zero political values. However, high political values (e.g.,
vpA1) do imply that the gains from not agreeing to a ceasefire are high for less profitable
locations, as their strategic markdowns under competition will be high. Along the same
line of reasoning, less profitable locations would have more to gain from competing if their
base profits are not much lower than the most profitable location (e.g., small πA2 − πA1).
4It took many years until the agreement to ban incentive provision to firm relocating within Kansas
City was made between the states of Kansas and Missouri (https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/blog/
first-ever-binding-end-border-war-missouri-kansas). On the other hand, a ceasefire proposal made
by New Jersey legislators to state governments of New York and Pennsylvania did not reach an agreement
(https://njbiz.com/nj-lawmakers-back-idea-tax-break-deal-border-states/).
5Since D̃A2A1 = −1, A1’s net gain from winning is given by vA1 − bA1 = −DA1(bA1) + ṽA2A1 . A2’s net gain
from winning is similarly derived.
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4 Empirical evidence on political values and freeriding
Using equilibrium relationships between locations’ values and optimal bids, I conduct two
empirical exercises to learn about political values and freeriding behavior without estimating
the model primitives. First, I provide reduced-form evidence suggesting that political values
increase with the intensity of within-metro competition and that locations freeride when
economic values spill over. Second, I perform back-of-the-envelope calculations of lower




My empirical analysis exploits variation in locations’ freeriding motives, captured by the
spillover coefficient γms
′
ms in the model. I define location ms at the level of Core-Based
Statistical Area (CBSA) and state and use 2011-2015 5-Year ACS Commuting Flows data
to approximate the number of jobs that will flow over to ms when ms′ attracts a firm..6
γms
′




Share of ms′ workforce that resides in ms




ms to approximate the likelihood of a ms resident being hired by a firm located
in ms′ relative to a firm located in ms.7 For example, suppose a third of Chicago-IL
workforce resides in Chicago-IN and two-thirds of Chicago-IN workforce resides in Chicago-
IN. I approximate the likelihood of a firm located in Chicago-IL hiring a Chicago-IN resident
as 0.33, and the likelihood of a firm located in Chicago-IN hiring a Chicago-IN resident as
0.66. In this particular example, γChi−ILChi−IN =
0.33
0.66 = 0.5, and spillover value that Chicago-IN
derives when Chicago-IL lands a firm would be half the economic value that Chicago-IN
derives when it lands the same firm.
Proposed specification of γms
′
ms is motivated by anecdotal evidence that economic values of
attracting firms are mainly driven by the number of jobs.8 However, this specification omits
several factors that may enter the relationship between ms’s economic and spillover values.
For example, economic benefits associated with corporate income taxes that ms cannot
derive when ms′ attracts a firm may create an upward bias in γms
′
ms . On the other hand,
ms may face smaller economic losses associated with congestion and pollution when ms′
attracts a firm, creating a downward bias in γms
′
ms . See appendix for details on construction
6Out of 381 (536) Metropolitan (Micropolitan) Statistical Areas, 39 (14) have two states, 6 (1) have
three states, and 2 (0) have four states. Table 4 shows these 62 multi-state CBSA.
7γms
′
ms can be treated as an equilibrium outcome of workers’ location decisions in a richer spatial equi-






4.1 Accepted incentives regressions
I use data on accepted incentives to run the following regression:
bjmst = β











+ ξs + φt + εjmst.
bjmst is the amount of incentives accepted by firm j from location ms in year t. xjmst is a
vector of observable location and firm characteristics that likely enter locations’ economic




ms is sum of ms’s
spillover coefficients. Nms is the number of states in metro m. ξs and φt are state and year
fixed effects respectively. εjmst is the error term.
Accepted incentives data are from Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker and location char-
acteristics are collected from external sources. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
Details on sample selection and data sources are provided in the appendix.
Table 1: Summary statistics
N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max
Panel A: Accepted incentives and firm characteristics
Incentives ($ mil) 101949 1.62 41.8 0.08 0.01 8700
Jobs 35525 160.96 1003.16 41 1 120262
Manufacturer (0/1) 27630 0.58 0.49 1 0 1
Panel B: CBSA characteristics
Unemployment rate 5141 7.94 3 7.4 1.7 23.3
Median earnings 5172 31822.51 4706.71 31284.5 17408 60093
Population (mil) 5173 0.44 1.08 0.13 0.04 15.76
College attainment rate 5173 24.6 8.32 23.4 9.4 60.6
Number of states (2013 OMB) 929 1.08 0.32 1 1 4
Panel C: CBSA-state characteristics
Sum of spillover coefficients 1002 0.02 0.06 0 0 0.5
Notes: Details on sample selection for incentives data are in the appendix. Number of states in CBSA and
sum of spillover coefficients are for all 929 CBSA and 1002 CBSA-state combinations respectively. All other
CBSA characteristics are restricted to CBSA represented in the accepted incentives data for years 2005-2016.
Data sources are shown in appendix.
First-order condition for optimal bids implies that the magnitude of a location’s freerid-
ing markdown, is increasing in: (1) the spillover coefficient, γms
′
ms ; (2) number of local
competitors of ms; and (3) magnitude of diversion ratio,
∣∣∣D̃ms′ms ∣∣∣. First two implications
translate to β2, β3 < 0 in the regression, which controls for unobserved state heterogeneity
(ξs) and observables (xjmst) that likely enter locations’ values and firms’ profits. The last
implication can be translated to β4, β5 > 0 assuming that smaller firms are more likely to
search locally and have strong preferences for particular metros, yielding higher magnitudes
of diversion ratios for metros actually chosen by firms. Effects of the spillover coefficient
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and the number of local competitors on freeriding markdowns will then be amplified for
smaller firms.
Table 2 shows the regression results. Positive β3 contradicts the model implication
that locations freeride more when facing more local competitors, instead suggesting that
political values increase with the number of local competitors. Further, negative β4 suggests
that political values of winning against local competitors are concentrated on smaller firms
that are less likely to consider other metros. These findings suggest that political values
increase with the intensity of within-metro competition as measured by the number of
local competitors and the likelihood of firms restricting their chioces to particular metros.
Based on discussion in Section 3, ceasefire on incentive provision at the metro-level without
transfers is unlikely to benefit individual locations when political values are high even if
firms are locked in to the metro.
On the other hand, negative β2 is consistent with the model implication that locations
freeride more when more economic spillovers can be derived from having local competitors
win. Further, positive β4 suggests that locations do not freeride as much when competing
for larger firms that are more likely to consider multiple metros, a finding that is also
consistent with the model implication.
Table 2: Accepted incentives regressions
Dependent variable: log accepted incentives
(1) (2)
Log jobs (β1) 0.391∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.424∗∗∗ (0.023)
Manufacturer (β1) 0.099∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.097∗∗∗ (0.032)
Unemployment rate (β1) 0.065∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.065∗∗∗ (0.013)
Log median earnings (β1) 1.093∗∗∗ (0.304) 1.050∗∗∗ (0.302)
Log population (β1) −0.043∗ (0.024) −0.020 (0.024)
College attainment rate (β1) 0.014∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.004)
Sum of spillover coefficients (β2) −0.411 (0.584) −16.027∗∗∗ (1.542)
Number of states in CBSA (β3) 0.129∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.389∗∗∗ (0.094)
Log jobs×sum of spillover coefficients (β4) 3.312∗∗∗ (0.306)
Log jobs×number of states in CBSA (β5) −0.062∗∗∗ (0.018)
Year/state fixed effects (φt, ξs) Y/Y Y/Y
Constant (β0) −1.811 (3.014) −1.684 (2.997)
Observations 11,152 11,152
R2 0.324 0.333
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. See appendix for details on sample selection, data sources, and
construction of spillover coefficient.
4.2 Bounding political values
Conservative upper bounds on quantiles of locationms’s political values can be derived using
the first-order condition and the assumption that equilibrium bids are strictly increasing in
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economic and political values:
vp(q)ms ≤ vp(q)ms + ve(q)ms (1 + D̃(q)ms) = b(q)ms −D(q)ms,
where (q) superscript indicates the qth quantile, and the firm subscript j is suppressed,
conditioning on firm covariates. The same upper bounds can also be derived by assuming
the lowest possible v
e(q)




ms −D(q)ms by the first-order condition.
Conservative lower bounds on quantiles of location ms’s political values can be obtained
by differencing first-order conditions of ms and location m̂s that has identical economic
values as ms (i.e., FV e
m̂s
= FV ems) but does not face local competitors (i.e., D̃
(q)
m̂s = 0). Specif-





































m̂s ≥ 0 is
used in the last inequality. This lower bound corresponds to the case when ms has the
highest possible v
e(q)





ms is thus bounded as follows:






ms ≤ b(q)ms −D(q)ms. (4)
As ms’s incentive to freeride increases (i.e., lower D̃
(q)
ms), economic (political) value has
less (more) role in explaining ms’s bid and strategic markdown, b
(q)
ms − D(q)ms, narrowing
bounds on v
p(q)
ms . When D̃
(q)
ms = −1, ms shades its entire economic value to freeride, in which
case ms’s bid and strategic markdown are left to be explained solely by ms’s political value;
v
p(q)
ms is point identified at the upper bound, b
(q)
ms −D(q)ms.
To obtain intuition on the informational content of Inequality 4, consider an example








ms) = (−50,−75). As for D̃(q)ms, I
assume that ms has one local competitor and consider two cases with D̃
(q)
ms = −0.25 and
D̃
(q)
ms = −0.75. In both cases, the highest possible ve(q)m̂s that can rationalize b
(q)




m̂s = 100 (blue bar for m̂s in top row figures).
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100 0 -50 0
100 100 -75 -25
0 100 -50 0
0 175 -75 0
100 0 -50 0
100 150 -75 -75
0 100 -50 0
0 175 -75 0
-200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250
-200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250
-200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250
Economic value Political value
Strategic markdown Freeriding markdown
-200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250
Lower bound on  :vp(q)ms
Upper bound on  :vp(q)ms
First case:  (D̃(q) ̂ms , D̃(q)ms) = (0, − 0.25) Second case:  (D̃(q) ̂ms , D̃(q)ms) = (0, − 0.75)
Table 2
Bid Strategic markdown (D) Freeriding markdown (D tilde) 










First case with D̃
(q)
ms = −0.25 is shown in the first column of Figure 2. Since ve(q)m̂s = v
e(q)
ms ,
the highest possible v
e(q)
ms is 100 (blue bar for ms in top left figure), implying that the lowest
possible v
p(q)
ms is 100 (green bar for ms in top left figure).10 On the other hand, since the
lowest possible v
e(q)
ms is zero, the highest possible v
p(q)
ms is 175 (green bar for ms in bottom
left figure).11 Second case with D̃qms = −0.75 is shown in the second column of Figure 2.
Going through a similar logic as in the first case, the lowest possible v
p(q)
ms is 150 (green bar
for ms in bottom right figure), and the highest possible v
p(q)
ms is 175 (green bar for ms in
bottom right figure).
The bound on v
p(q)
ms is narrower in the second case, because, all else equal, ms shades
a larger share of v
e(q)
ms to freeride. In result, a larger share of b
(q)
ms is left to be explained
by v
p(q)
ms when assuming the highest possible v
e(q)





I perform back-of-the-envelope calculations of the lower bounds on political values under
two simplifying assumptions. First, I assume that ms is competing for firms that are certain





′ wins j | ms offers b to j)
∂
∂b Pr(ms wins j | ms offers b to j)





















ms −D(q)ms = 100 + 75 = 175.
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Second, I assume that ms’s political values are not smaller than its freeriding markdowns
at each quantile:







First assumption allows me to consider cases where freeriding motives can be maximally
exploited to derive lower bounds on political values; when firms are certain to choose partic-
ular metros. Second assumption provides a way to express the lower bound as a fraction of
the upper bound. Full implementation of the bounding strategy using Inequality 4 without
these two assumptions requires estimation of model primitives (distributions of equilibrium







Using two assumptions made above, the lower bound on v
p(q)
ms can be modified as:
vp(q)ms = b
(q)


















ms indicates how close v
p(q)
ms must be to (b
(q)





ms = 0. Consistent with the intuition demonstrated in the previous example,
more information can be obtained for locations with higher incentives to freeride, as the
lower bound on political value quantile is increasing in mins∈Sm\s γ
ms′
ms .
Table 4 shows mins∈Sm\s γ
ms′
ms computed for locations with at least one local competi-
tor. Mean and median mins∈Sm\s γ
ms′
ms are 0.127 and 0.098 respectively. mins∈Sm\s γ
ms′
ms
ranges from 5e-05 (Chicago-Naperville-Elgin–WI) to 0.490 (Sioux City–IA). According to
my model, Sioux City–IA’s political values for firms that are certain to locate in Sioux City
must be at least half of maximum political values at each quantile. On the other hand, the
lower bounds on Chicago–Wisconsin’s political values for firms that are certain to locate in
Chicago are close to zero and not informative.
To compute in dollar terms lower bounds on political values of KS and MO in Kansas
City, I use accepted incentives data collected by Hall Family Foundation. Table 3 shows
that KS and MO paid $199 and $213 million dollars respectively from 2010 to 2019 to
relocate firms from each other’s jurisdiction in Kansas City. Assuming these relocated firms
are certain to have chosen Kansas City as often depicted in the media, Table 3 shows that
KS and MO’s total political values for firms that they won are at least $36 (=0.183×199)







(−D(q)ms), which when included will further raise the
lower bounds. Political values per job, on the other hand, are at least $5000 and $8000 for
KS and MO respectively.
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Table 3: Firm relocations across state border in Kansas City: accepted incentives and
implied lower bounds on political values
Incentives paid by
Kansas Missouri
Panel A: Accepted incentives
Total accepted incentives ($ million) 198.570 212.519
Total jobs 7,449 6,565
Number of accepted incentives 74 38
Panel B: Implied lower bounds on political values
Total political values ($ million) 36.338 52.280
Political value per firm ($ million/firm) 0.491 1.376
Political value per job ($ million/job) 0.005 0.008
Notes: Accepted incentives data are from Hall Family Foundation, tracking firms that relocated across the







, where Jms is the set of firms that relocated from ms′ to ms, and bjms
are the incentives accepted by j from ms.
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Table 4: Spillover coefficients: mins∈Sm\s γ
ms′
ms
CBSA State Min 𝜸 CBSA State Min 𝜸 CBSA State Min 𝜸
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ NJ 0.012 Fort Smith, AR-OK AR 0.092 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD DE 0.010
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ PA 0.203 Fort Smith, AR-OK OK 0.112 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD MD 0.001
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC GA 0.167 Grand Forks, ND-MN MN 0.140 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD NJ 0.004
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC SC 0.116 Grand Forks, ND-MN ND 0.185 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD PA 0.049
Berlin, NH-VT NH 0.181 Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV MD 0.060 Point Pleasant, WV-OH OH 0.116
Berlin, NH-VT VT 0.071 Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV WV 0.132 Point Pleasant, WV-OH WV 0.142
Bluefield, WV-VA VA 0.143 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH KY 0.044 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA OR 0.115
Bluefield, WV-VA WV 0.179 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH OH 0.144 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA WA 0.073
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH MA 0.086 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH WV 0.083 Providence-Warwick, RI-MA MA 0.080
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH NH 0.024 Iron Mountain, MI-WI MI 0.327 Providence-Warwick, RI-MA RI 0.140
Burlington, IA-IL IL 0.088 Iron Mountain, MI-WI WI 0.109 Quincy, IL-MO IL 0.036
Burlington, IA-IL IA 0.052 Jackson, WY-ID ID 0.117 Quincy, IL-MO MO 0.049
Cape Girardeau, MO-IL IL 0.028 Jackson, WY-ID WY 0.034 St. Joseph, MO-KS KS 0.039
Cape Girardeau, MO-IL MO 0.044 Kansas City, MO-KS KS 0.183 St. Joseph, MO-KS MO 0.290
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC NC 0.181 Kansas City, MO-KS MO 0.246 St. Louis, MO-IL IL 0.077
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC SC 0.062 Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA TN 0.263 St. Louis, MO-IL MO 0.073
Chattanooga, TN-GA GA 0.170 Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA VA 0.151 Salisbury, MD-DE DE 0.116
Chattanooga, TN-GA TN 0.137 La Crosse-Onalaska, WI-MN MN 0.076 Salisbury, MD-DE MD 0.059
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI IL 0.080 La Crosse-Onalaska, WI-MN WI 0.133 Sioux City, IA-NE-SD IA 0.490
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI IN 0.015 Lewiston, ID-WA ID 0.472 Sioux City, IA-NE-SD NE 0.137
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI WI 0.000 Lewiston, ID-WA WA 0.359 Sioux City, IA-NE-SD SD 0.067
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN IN 0.019 Logan, UT-ID ID 0.038 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI IN 0.093
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN KY 0.050 Logan, UT-ID UT 0.098 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI MI 0.049
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN OH 0.112 Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN IN 0.093 Texarkana, TX-AR AR 0.353
Claremont-Lebanon, NH-VT NH 0.174 Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN KY 0.136 Texarkana, TX-AR TX 0.375
Claremont-Lebanon, NH-VT VT 0.184 Marinette, WI-MI MI 0.252 Union City, TN-KY KY 0.072
Clarksville, TN-KY KY 0.082 Marinette, WI-MI WI 0.236 Union City, TN-KY TN 0.324
Clarksville, TN-KY TN 0.445 Memphis, TN-MS-AR AR 0.004 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC NC 0.013
Columbus, GA-AL AL 0.222 Memphis, TN-MS-AR MS 0.030 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC VA 0.055
Columbus, GA-AL GA 0.260 Memphis, TN-MS-AR TN 0.132 Wahpeton, ND-MN MN 0.287
Cumberland, MD-WV MD 0.283 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI MN 0.100 Wahpeton, ND-MN ND 0.381
Cumberland, MD-WV WV 0.170 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI WI 0.018 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV DC 0.003
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL IL 0.270 Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC-NC NC 0.020 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV MD 0.040
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL IA 0.236 Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC-NC SC 0.026 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV VA 0.039
Duluth, MN-WI MN 0.253 Natchez, MS-LA LA 0.147 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV WV 0.002
Duluth, MN-WI WI 0.091 Natchez, MS-LA MS 0.189 Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH OH 0.171
Evansville, IN-KY IN 0.116 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA NJ 0.049 Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH WV 0.123
Evansville, IN-KY KY 0.039 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA NY 0.046 Wheeling, WV-OH OH 0.237
Fargo, ND-MN MN 0.240 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA PA 0.001 Wheeling, WV-OH WV 0.146
Fargo, ND-MN ND 0.373 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA IA 0.077 Winchester, VA-WV VA 0.010
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO AR 0.141 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA NE 0.252 Winchester, VA-WV WV 0.075
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO MO 0.015 Ontario, OR-ID ID 0.318 Worcester, MA-CT CT 0.020
Fort Madison-Keokuk, IA-IL-MO IL 0.005 Ontario, OR-ID OR 0.157 Worcester, MA-CT MA 0.038
Fort Madison-Keokuk, IA-IL-MO IA 0.053 Paducah, KY-IL IL 0.067 Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA OH 0.098
Fort Madison-Keokuk, IA-IL-MO MO 0.003 Paducah, KY-IL KY 0.164 Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA PA 0.021
Notes: This table shows each location ms’s smallest spillover coefficient, mins∈Sm\s γ
ms′
ms using 2011-2015 5-Year ACS Commuting Flows data. Appendix





I present a model of government competition for firms in which governments have economic
and political values for firms and governments derive economic spillovers from wins of
nearby jurisdictions. I show that governments can locally coordinate to improve their joint
expected welfare. There are two channels of gains from coordination which are at tension:
internalization of competitive externalities and economic spillovers. Ceasefire on incentive
provision, which has been publicly discussed as a regional development policy, may not
improve individual locations’ welfare without transfers when political values are high.
Using equilibrium relationships between values and optimal bids and observed shifters of
economic spillovers, I provide empirical evidence that political values tend to be positively
correlated with the intensity of within-metro competition as measured by the number of
states in metro and firm size. I also find evidence of governments’ freeriding behavior.
The model also implies that the magnitudes of economic spillovers are informative of the
magnitudes of political values. I conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculations of the lower
bounds on political values.
This paper provides several directions for future research. While this paper distinguishes
economic and political values for firms, the mechanism behind how political values are gen-
erated is not made explicit. Specifically, how incentive provision is determined by reelection
motives and political influence wielded by firms through lobbying and campaign contribu-
tions (e.g., Richter et al. (2009), Bombardini and Trebbi (2011), DiSalvo and Li (2020)) can
be examined further. Effects of worker mobility on economic spillovers can also be studied
further in a broader spatial equilibrium framework.
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A. Simulation exercise details
A1, A2, and B3’s economic values for firms, vems, are iid draws from a truncated normal distribution
(µ = 5.5, σ2 = 1, [a, b] = [5, 6]). Political values, vpms, comonotonic with v
e
ms, are drawn from a
standard uniform distribution. I vary the spillover coefficient, γ = γA2A1 = γ
A1
A2 , from 0 to 0.1, at
increment of 0.02. All three locations have identical deterministic firm profitabilities, βxxπms = 1. I
vary the nesting parameter, σ, from 0 to 0.75 at increment of 0.15. Under this setup, I numerically
solve for equilibrium bidding strategies of A1, A2, and B3 using Equations 1 and 2. In case without
A1 and A2’s coordination, I assume bids to be quadratic in values for firms. In case with A1 and
A2’s coordination, I further assume A1 and A2’s bids to be quadratic in both vA1 and vA2. In both
cases, I impose symmetry between A1 and A2’s bid functions. Draws of values for firms (vjms) and
firm profit shocks (εjms) are held constant across different combinations of γ and σ.
B. Data sources
Data Years Source
Accepted incentives 05-16 Good Jobs First
Accepted incentives (Kansas City) 10-19 Hall Family Foundation
Median earnings, unemployment, population, college attainment 05-16 ACS
CBSA delineations 13 OMB
County to subdivision crosswalk 10 Census
CBSA to county crosswalk 13 NBER
County-to-county commuting flows 11-15 ACS
B. Sample selection
Raw data from the Good Jobs first Subsidy Tracker (December 2016 version) contains 525,613
observations on incentives provided by federal, state, and local governments. I exclude: (1) incentives
provided at the federal level (193,155 observations including 21 missing); (2) incentives provided
before year 2005 (76,874 observations including 26,527 missing); (3) incentives worth less than
$10,000 (121,616 observations); (4) training and cost reimbursements (15,907 observations); and (5)
incentives provided to oil refineries (198 observations). I combine multiple incentives provided to the
same firm by same city/county in same year (15,914 observations). With these restrictions, I obtain
a sample of 101,949 observations of which 72,967 are matched to 2010 Census County Subdivision
Data and NBER CBSA to County Crosswalk Data using fuzzy matching of location information
(city, county, state). Sample includes 834 unique locations, defined as CBSA-state combination.
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C. Construction of spillover coefficient: γms
′
ms
For each location ms with at least one local competitor, I compute the following variables using
2011-2015 5-Year ACS Commuting Flows data:
Share of ms′ workforce that resides in ms =
Total commuters from ms to ms′
Total commuters to ms′
Share of ms workforce that resides in ms =
Total commuters from ms to ms
Total commuters to ms
,
which I divide to compute γms
′
ms ≡ Share of ms
′ workforce that resides in ms
Share of ms workforce that resides in ms .
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